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New Directions for Empirical Studies of
Direct Democracy
Joshua J. Dyck*
INTRODUCTION
The American Constitution and the documents and
arguments that spurred it reveal a very real fear about the
potential of unfettered public opinion to do harm to society. The
central purpose of checks and balances and the separation of
powers is to disallow any single individual or like-minded faction
from governing. Despite this fact, direct democracy has played a
much larger role in American society than the framers of the
Constitution envisioned. Today, the ballot initiative, a process
which allows citizens of states to write and propose laws, is
available in twenty-four of the fifty states. In forty-nine of fifty
states, voter approval is needed to change state constitutions.1
Additionally, about three-quarters of localities allow some form of
direct democracy to make decisions. It has been about one
hundred years since this experiment began. Today, it is quite
common to ask the public to express an opinion on many of the
most pressing public concerns.
To be sure, direct democracy does not occur in a vacuum.
Instead, courts are often called upon to exercise judicial review of
the decisions made at the ballot box. However, the imprint of
policy changes left by the ballot initiative is indelible. The ballot
initiative has been used to define marriage, alter affirmative
action, define citizenship, change the processes of voting and
redistricting, impose term limits, and affect every part of a state
and local budget from school funding to tax rates/bases to a
variety of bonded projects, to name just a few examples. It has
also been used to consider questions of personhood for unborn
fetuses, to decide on siting of casinos, to ban certain types of
traps used in hunting, and to determine the legitimacy of
cockfighting.2 Citizens of places with a vibrant initiative culture

* Associate Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Center for Public
Opinion Research at the University of Massachusetts Lowell.
1 Frederick J. Boehmke & Joshua J. Dyck, Initiative and Referendum, in GUIDE TO
STATE POLITICS AND POLICY 75, 75 (Richard G. Niemi & Joshua J. Dyck eds., 2014).
2 A complete catalog of this history of ballot initiatives, popular referendums and
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also experience a completely different kind of campaign.
Well-funded initiative campaigns can capture the majority of
airwaves in the time leading up to a statewide election; ballots
can run pages deep.3
As ballot initiatives increased in usage in the late 1970s, so
too did scholarship examining the impacts of ballot initiatives.
The debate over direct democracy reforms in the United States
was filled with a great deal of hyperbole, as reform movements
are prone to attract.4 Proponents of the initiative and
referendum, the Progressives, decried that direct democracy was
the cure to the ills of corruption in government, the vehicle for
engaging and informing disinterested and disaffected voters, and
the pathway to a better relationship between the public and
government.5 Opponents of initiatives worried of the potential for
popular voting to quickly degenerate into mob rule, deny rights
to minorities, expropriate property, create irresponsible budgets,
and be overrun by outside money.6 After decades of empirical
research that evaluated many of the claims of initiative
proponents and opponents, it is safe to say that neither the
greatest hopes of progressive reformers, nor the worst fears of its
critics have entirely materialized.
The purpose of this Article is to serve as a guidepost to those
interested in empirically-based scholarship about direct
democracy, citizens, policy, and the legal process. What have we
learned about how the initiative impacts policy? How does direct
democracy find its way into the American form of government?
What impact does the initiative have on citizens, interest groups,
and political parties? And finally, does the possibility of direct
democracy increase threats to minorities? Underlying all of this
is a general theme that, in addition to testing empirical claims,
studies should do more to theorize thoughtfully about the impact
legislatively referred statutes, and constitutional amendments is available through the
National Conference of State Legislatures. Ballot Measures Database, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/ballot-measures-data
base.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2015).
3 In Colorado in 2008, for instance, there were eighteen measures placed on the
ballot. Colorado voters also faced a great deal of attention from the presidential campaign,
along with competitive Senate and gubernatorial races. Colorado 2008 Ballot Measures,
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_2008_ballot_measures [http://perma.cc/2EZ
6-T4DB].
4 See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 10 (1956).
5 See generally THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989); DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT,
EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2004).
6 See DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE
POWER OF MONEY (2000); RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE
PROCESS IN AMERICA (2002).
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of the initiative process and rely less and less on political
movements to provide testable hypotheses. Political movements,
no matter how successful or well intentioned, are political
movements; their arguments are, at least in part, designed to
persuade. Well-crafted social science theories, on the contrary,
are meant to serve as plausible stories of the way the world
works, so that one can examine the observable implications of
them and test them. It turns out that the Progressives were
wrong about a lot of things, and we narrow our focus by
examining direct democracy through a lens that focuses on a
checklist of what they were right and wrong about. Because of
that, research on the secondary effects of direct democracy
remains ripe for theoretical and empirical development. I turn
first to the primary or policy effects of direct democracy, as a
means to motivate the import of the study of secondary effects.
I. POLICY IMPACTS
A general question, which has widely interested scholars,
theorists, and citizens alike, is how does having the ballot
initiative change which policies states adopt? In reviewing some
of the existing literature and developing this idea, I will focus on
two broad themes:
A. Ballot-initiative entrepreneurs are not representative of
the mass public, nor are they particularly representative
of elected officials. The ballot initiative process
incentivizes extremism.
B. The courts and bureaucrats play a central role in limiting
policy impacts via the ballot initiative; initiatives get
“stolen” all the time and, therefore, measuring policy
impacts can be challenging.7
A. Extremism
In an argument best articulated by Besley and Coate, in
theory, the ballot initiative process has the ability to unbundle
policy issues.8 Unbundling means that each citizen gets to
express his or her policy positions on individual issues, rather
than having to choose a candidate who best approximates his or
her views on a basket of issues. Choosing a candidate is a rather
poor metric of preference realization for an individual. A voter

7 See generally Elisabeth R. Gerber et al., Stealing the Initiative: How State
Government Responds to Direct Democracy (2001).
8 Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Issue Unbundling Via Citizens’ Initiatives
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8036, 2000), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w8036.pdf [http://perma.cc/FB3M-SC2Q].
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may privilege a single issue position or a small set of issue
positions that a candidate holds over others in making a vote
determination. Or, more likely, individual voters may have given
scant thought to the policy issues at stake and simply vote with
the party with which they identify.9 Regardless, the opportunity
to select issues one at a time should, in theory, moderate politics
away from the political poles if voters are more moderate than
legislators. Legislators have grown increasingly polarized in the
last few decades,10 and citizens are not nearly as policy-oriented,
ideological, or extreme as legislators.11 An example of this process
at work might be that a tax-cut conservative would be free to
vote in favor of same-sex marriage, or an ardently devout
Catholic may be able to support social welfare programs from the
left and also support restricting access to abortions.
The problem with unbundling is that it misses key
components of the way that ballot initiative campaigns actually
unfold and how voters think. First, it does not consider the
incentive structure of who initiative entrepreneurs are and why
they would choose the ballot initiative as a means to attempt to
pursue their political goals. Second, it misunderstands a simple
reality of public opinion in America—while there are many
policies on which people will express opinions, the depth of
opinion holding on policy issues is thin and fragile. Furthermore,
precisely as people become more informed, they become more
ideologically consistent; those with enough knowledge and
awareness have a tendency to support policy sets that cohere
with those of their party.
1. Initiative Entrepreneurs
Pushing a policy agenda by direct democracy is time
consuming and costly. The incidence of grassroots-based
initiatives that are not backed by a wealthy individual or
established interest groups is quite low, if not nonexistent.12
Scholars have used the “setter model” to explain how initiatives
come into existence—if we assume that agenda setters (or those
who would propose initiatives) are rational and self-interested,

9 See generally ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); DONALD P.
GREEN ET AL., PARTISAN HEARTS AND MINDS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE SOCIAL
IDENTITIES OF VOTERS (2002).
10 See, e.g., NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY
AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2006); see also Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological
Mapping of American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 530, 546 (2011).
11 See KAREN M. KAUFMANN ET AL., UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM: FACTS AND MYTHS
ABOUT AMERICAN VOTERS 49 (2008). See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE
WAR?: THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2005).
12 See ELLIS, supra note 6, at 54–55.
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then they will propose measures that are as close to their own
personal preferences, but which are still likely to be approved by
the median voter.13 To be sure, historically, 60% of initiatives fail,
which indicates that initiative entrepreneurs frequently have
imperfect information about the preferences of the median voter,
mistakenly think their argument will carry the day with voters,
or simply do not care if the measure will meet defeat because the
campaign and issues are “too important” not to be heard.
One of the most important recent insights from this
literature came from Boehmke and Patty, who argue that
initiative entrepreneurs are likely to be those without means to
seek agenda status through conventional means.14 This occurs
because the time, money, and low probability of success of the
initiative process are generally going to be attractive to
individuals with a lot of money who do not feel represented
through the traditional legislative process. This will promote
extremism. Indeed it is not all that difficult to identify some of
the most famous initiative entrepreneurs. For example, Howard
Jarvis famously spearheaded the Proposition 13 campaign in
California that is said to have started the tax revolt.15 Tim
Eyman is a household name to Washington state voters; he has
written more than twenty conservative initiatives in the
Evergreen State since the late 1990s.16
There are additional groups that may be slightly different
than the lone, extreme ideological-initiative entrepreneur.
Members of a consistent minority party in a one-sided state
legislature may turn to the initiative process to try to push
policies which are never put on the agenda by the majority
party.17 Additionally, in times of divided government, direct
democracy has been used as a means to attempt to break
legislative impasse. This was the strategy employed by Governor
13 Arthur Lupia, Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information, 86 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 390, 391 (1992); Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource
Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27, 29 (1978).
14 Frederick J. Boehmke & John W. Patty, The Selection of Policies for Ballot
Initiatives: What Voters can Learn from Legislative Inaction, 19 ECON. & POL. 97, 121
(2007).
15 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Howard_
Jarvis_Taxpayers_Association [http://perma.cc/M3K7-RW8S].
16 Tim Eyman, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Tim_Eyman [http://perma.cc/9P
5L-NE5L].
17 For instance, while in control of the New York State Senate, in efforts
spearheaded by Senator Joseph Robach (R-56th District), Republicans have continually
attempted to pass direct democracy reforms in the belief that implementation of these
institutions would lead to a citizen tax revolt in the Empire State. The Assembly, which
has long been controlled by Democrats, has repeatedly stalled these efforts at reform. New
York Initiative and Referendum Amendment (2013), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/
New_York_Initiative_and_Referendum_Amendment_(2013) [http://perma.cc/H2G7-KXCV].
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Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2005. After becoming Governor of
California in 2003, via an unprecedented recall election, he
turned to the ballot initiative in an attempt to pass his reform
agenda when he reached an impasse with the legislature; his
proposals included curbing teacher tenure, restricting the use of
union dues for political purposes, limiting state spending, and
reforming redistricting. His policy agenda was resoundingly
rejected by voters.18
Schwarzenegger’s experience is a cautionary tale. In lieu of
working to forge a compromise, he was rebuffed and forced to
abandon all the key elements of his campaign. Because of the
dichotomous nature of the choice (i.e., “yes” or “no”), there are a
number of incentives for policy entreprenuers to not participate
in the ballot initiative process where a lot is risked on a single up
or down vote from the public, whose preferences and propensity
to participate may be unknown. On the other hand, those who
are likely to risk their time, money, and energy on qualifying an
initiative and contesting a campaign are those who care deeply
about the issue at hand, have been stymied by the legislative
process, and have resources to both qualify and campaign in
favor of an initiative. The incentives for individuals to attempt to
push for policies from the extremities of the political process are
stronger than the incentives for individuals to push from the
center. Despite the seeming logic of unbundling leading to a
moderated set of policy issues, this conventional wisdom about
which measures will qualify for the ballot fails to consider how
initiatives are written and who has the incentive to write them.
There are two caveats to this perspective that should be
noted. First, there have been successful reform movements in
states which, at face value, can be argued are not particularly
ideological—two obvious instances of this are term limits and
redistricting. However, even non-partisan measures can be
viewed through partisan lenses. On redistricting measures, for
instance, partisan support for a measure is typically much
stronger among citizens who are members of the out-party in
government.19 Likewise, support for direct democracy institutions
tends to be strongest among members of the out-party. Therefore,
even baseline institutional support cannot escape the long and

18 Joshua J. Dyck & Mark Baldassare, Process Preferences and Voting in Direct
Democratic Elections, 73 P UB . OPINION Q. 551, 554 (2009) [hereinafter Dyck
& Baldassare, Process Preferences]; Joshua J. Dyck & Mark Baldassare, The Limits of
Citizen Support for Direct Democracy, 4 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2012).
19 Caroline J. Tolbert et al., Strategic Voting and Legislative Redistricting
Reform: District and Statewide Representational Winners and Losers, 62 POL. RES. Q. 92,
95 (2009).
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influential arm of political parties in American society. Even if
we grant that these reform movements are an exception to the
rule, the typical initiative entrepreneur is not promoting
center-driven reform proposals, due to the general lack incentives
to do so.
2. Ideology and Political Awareness
The picture of all of this becomes clearer when considering
the present state of research on public opinion, ideology, and
awareness. Put quite simply, the average American is not
particularly ideological, at least in the sense that they do not
hold consistently extreme views associated with an underlying
belief structure like American “conservatism” or “liberalism.”
Curiously, despite the fact that belief systems are poorly defined,
about nine in ten Americans have an attachment to a political
party that predicts fairly consistent voting patterns.20 The
question that remains is what happens in a campaign
environment where apoplectic initiative entrepreneurs present
their cases to a largely apathetic public. The result should not be
surprising, but looks nothing like the policy unbundling
perspective.
First and foremost, initiative elections are surprisingly
bound by cue-taking21 and party-line voting, despite the absence
of explicit partisan cues on the ballot and the opportunity for an
individual to engage in nuanced preference revelation.22 This
means that, absent fully developed policy preferences on a host of
issues, voters go to the polls and look for cues from trusted elites
and parties—they find these cues and they vote in a manner
consistent with them.
Some scholars have suggested that ballot initiatives are
truly to be understood as checks on the government where the
public rights the ship.23 Matsusaka, for instance, argues that the
ballot initiative acted as a corrective to over-taxing and state
spending; he notes that, at other points in time, the initiative has
been used to fuel the expansion of government.24

See BRUCE E. KEITH ET AL., THE MYTH OF THE INDEPENDENT VOTER (1992).
Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior
in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 65 (1994).
22 Regina P. Branton, Examining Individual-Level Voting Behavior on State Ballot
Propositions, 56 POL. RES. Q. 367, 367 (2003); Joshua J. Dyck, Politcal Distrust and
Conservative Voting in Ballot Measure Elections, 63 POL. RES. Q. 612, 613 (2010).
23 See generally ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP
INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION (1999).
24 JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 79 (2004).
20
21
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Yet, there are obvious problems with the proposition that
initiatives are “for the many” and not “for the few,” or that we
should consider the outcome of all public votes as a pure
reflection of voter preferences. First, the outcome of any initiative
election is a function of what the electorate looks like relative to
the voting-eligible population. There are numerous exogenous
factors that influence turnout, including national conditions, the
presence of competitive elections, the presence of a presidential
election, and resources spent by campaigns and parties on voter
mobilization and targeting.25 As the distribution of the public
changes, results can change. Second, voting decisions are often
determined by the level of trust and confidence that individuals
express in government; repeated use of the initiative can lead to
a deterioration of trust, leading to outcomes consistent with
Matsusaka’s data that are not driven by ideological thinking.26
Finally, this perspective negates the importance and influence of
initiative entrepreneurs in the election process. In other words,
the “for the many” perspective negates the influence of lopsided
money and spending in elections. It argues that the side that was
preferred won, when it is quite clear that influence has been
monetized in modern elections and the side that won may have
had more resources.27 When we marry this finding with the
reality that voters are not particularly well informed, it becomes
a difficult argument to substantiate.
B. Initiative Theft
With the decisions in three cases, two in 2013 and one in
2015, the U.S. Supreme Court fully legalized same-sex marriage,
and, in so doing, invalidated laws passed in forty states,
thirty-three of which were approved by a majority of voters.28
While much is being written and talked about surrounding the
legal reasoning and shifting public opinion, less considered is the
Court’s role in acting as arbiter of the initiative process.

25 James E. Campbell, The Revised Theory of Surge and Decline, 31 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 965, 977 (1987).
26 Dyck, supra note 22, at 621.
27 There is a conflict regarding the role of money in elections. Surveys demonstrate
that voters are likely to view money as a problem in initiative elections. Dyck
& Baldassare, Process Preferences, supra note 18, at 562. Yet, others have argued that
money is more effective at generating “no” votes rather than “yes” votes. See generally
Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 99 (1996). This means that money helps to preserve the status quo over time in
initiative elections, which has been described as a good thing. MATSUSAKA, supra note 24,
at 12.
28 A good timeline on same-sex marriage and marriage bans is available from Pew
Research Center. Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pew
forum.org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state (last updated June 26, 2015).
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Interestingly, in the same Term, the same majority that
declared a constitutional right to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges29
also declared a constitutional equivalence of the ballot initiative
with legislative measures in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission.30 The core of this decision
was about whether the definition of “legislature” in the Elections
Clause of the U.S. Constitution puts ballot initiatives on equal
footing with legislative decisions. The clause states, “The Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations . . . .”31 The Court held, with
Justice Ginsberg writing for a five-to-four majority, that ballot
initiative decisions are equivalent to those made by the
legislature, if the state constitution so defines it (as does the
Arizona Constitution). Therefore, the U.S. Constitution does not
narrowly confine decisions about the conduct of elections to state
legislatures; in states with the ballot initiative, elections can be
regulated and administered by non-legislative entities, like the
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.
There is a certain irony that in a single Term, the Supreme
Court affirmed the value and import of the ballot initiative
process, while at the same time curbing one of the most
widespread and successful cross-state initiative campaigns in the
last hundred years. This contradiction highlights the interesting
role that ballot initiatives play in the constitutional structure of
American government. On the one hand, ballot initiatives can
change laws; however, the laws that are changed are often
controversial and may be subject to judicial review.
The Guarantee Clause of the Constitution guarantees that
each state will have a “republican” form of government.32 In
practice this means that every state was required to adopt a
reasonable facsimile of the national model with three branches of
government that includes an independent executive, legislature,
and judiciary, and is marked by checks and balances, separation
of powers, and judicial review. The twenty-four states that use
the ballot initiative decided to place an extra-legislative
institution into this framework; Garrett appropriately terms this
“hybrid democracy.”33 But, direct democracy institutions do not

29
30
31
32
33

(2005).

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
Id. art. IV, § 4.
See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096
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negate or replace the other institutions; they are meant as an
additional check. Likewise, direct legislation is also checked.
Initiative entrepreneurs are, therefore, presented with an
additional challenge. They must not only qualify measures for
the ballot by collecting petition signatures and run a campaign to
get a majority of voters to approve of their initiative, they must
also make sure that passed laws are not rolled back through
legislative means, poorly implemented by the bureaucracy, or
ruled constitutionally invalid by the courts. Gerber and others
present a model and several examples of when and how
initiatives are “stolen,” arguing that indeed it is very difficult to
take a proposed measure from inception to agenda status to
passage to implementation.34 The frequency with which passed
initiatives are stolen could be better understood—although
several important contributions have been made in this regard in
recent years.35
The import of this fact for scholars—that many initiatives
are not implemented—is that studying the primary effects of the
ballot initiative can be problematic. What are the net policy
impacts of thirty-three passed measures between 1998 and 2014
with regards to same-sex marriage when, in the end, the courts
invalidated all of these measures? The fact is that the policy
implications are difficult to detect. This highlights the need to
properly understand the effect this type of electoral environment
has on citizens. Is democracy harmed or hurt by frequent popular
votes, even when the most controversial ones are litigated? What
is the impact on society of subjecting our most controversial
debates to a series of elections in the states? The answer that I
offer is that scholarship can connect the primary (policy) effects
of direct democracy to the secondary (spillover) effects of direct
democracy.
II. SECONDARY EFFECTS
The Progressives promised renewed politics via the ballot
initiative. To be sure, the central goal of Progressive reformers
was not to invigorate democracy by promoting meaningful
participation, per se, but rather to check the power of parties,
and, particularly, of the stranglehold the railroad “robber barons”

See generally GERBER ET AL., supra note 7.
See generally KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS (2009)
(discussing the courts’ ability to strike down an approved initiative and the intensifying
conflict between direct democracy and judicial review); HENRY S. NOYES, THE LAW OF
DIRECT DEMOCRACY 333–83 (2014) (describing the obstacles that may prevent the
implementation of an approved ballot initiative).
34
35
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had put on the political process.36 The cocktail of reforms that
they proposed included both pro-democracy reforms like the
ballot initiative and referendum, but also less democratic reforms
that included insulating bureaucrats from the democratic process
by replacing a spoils system with a meritocracy.37 Despite the
fact that democracy in and of itself was not a primary ethos of
Progressives, it did not stop the claims that ballot initiatives
would enhance the democratic experience for voters.38 That is, in
addition to any alteration of politics, the process of voting on
individual laws, it was thought, would engage voters to become
more involved (and hence more informed, interested, efficacious,
and positively oriented towards government and politics).39
Two trends in academia helped to renew interest in studying
the plausible spillover effects of voter initiatives. The first was a
renewed interest on the part of scholars in studying civic
engagement due in large part to well-cited studies on declining
social capital in the United States and elsewhere.40 The second
was that direct democracy fit squarely into an emerging
participatory democracy framework, which argued that
expanding opportunities for individuals to participate enriches
democratic citizens’ views of their own capabilities and of
democracy more generally.41
In what follows, I develop an argument in an attempt to
recast the debate on the secondary effects of the ballot initiative
and encourage new scholarship. While there has been a great
deal of empirical research that has focused on secondary effects,
much of it has produced null or contradictory findings. This
problem, I contend, stems from the fact that theory has leaned
too heavily on the participatory democracy framework which has
been discredited by the empirics. In large part, this means that
scholarship has focused on civic engagement as the dependent
variable in studies of secondary effects. The failure of
See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 253–96 (2010).
See AMY BRIDGES, MORNING GLORIES: MUNICIPAL REFORM IN THE SOUTHWEST
3−30 (1997).
38 Wisconsin, for instance, seen as the center of the Progressive movement, rejected
adoption of the Initiative and Referendum, with 64% of the voting public opposing a
proposed constitutional amendment in 1914. Univ. of S. Cal., Wisconsin, INITIATIVE
& REFERENDUM INST., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Wisconsin.htm [http://perma.cc/MH
7M-529P]. For a good review of Wisconsin progressivism, see A Third of a Century of La
Folletteism, MILWAUKEE J. (Oct. 21, 1930), http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/Content.as
px?dsNav=N:4294963828-4294963788&dsRecordDetails=R:BA14305 (emphasizing “that
government can correct ills”).
39 See SMITH & TOLBERT, supra note 5, at 85–86.
40 See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,
J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1995, at 65, 67–68.
41 The strongest articulation of this argument is BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG
DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 117–20 (1984).
36
37
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participatory theory, as it regards the ballot initiative, however,
does not mean that studies of secondary effects should be
abandoned. Rather, given that the primary effects of the ballot
initiative are so frequently litigated or face difficulty in
implementation, the secondary effects of the ballot initiative
should be of particular interest and are of central importance.
They are just not well understood theoretically or empirically.
A. Participatory Democratic Theory: Null and Negative Results
The basic idea behind participatory democratic theory is that
voters will feel more connected to, and invested in, their
democracy if they are given more responsibility. Thinking of the
earlier discussion of policy unbundling, the theory is that, given
the opportunity to express nuance in political opinions, citizens
will develop them. There is a sort of backward induction of
participatory democratic theory which suggests that people are
apathetic and uninvolved because their participation lacks depth
and meaning. In this sense, voter apathy occurs when the
political process fails to actively engage citizens; if that were to
change, citizens would actually want to be more involved.42 Many
articles have been written looking at the plausible secondary
effects of direct democracy and, by and large, most of them make
overtures to some form of participatory theory and/or the
Progressive movement. Bowler and Donovan write:
Institutions of direct democracy thus provide a political context where
many citizens must consider and decide upon public issues and
policies — at least relatively more so than in a standard electoral
context. Where initiatives appear frequently on state ballots, it is
more likely that active campaigns or media coverage might focus
public attention on a major public issue or set of issues. In such an
environment, citizens may feel more competent about their political
skills as they receive more policy-relevant information than would
have otherwise been the case . . . .43

Going even further, Frey claims that: “[A] successful way to
maintain and enhance civic virtue are [sic] extensive
constitutional rights of direct citizen participation via popular
referenda and initiatives.”44
A great deal of recent research, however, poses problems for
the participatory democracy framework. First, the literature on
voting and mobilization has argued that the marginal decision to
See id. at 117–18; SMITH & TOLBERT, supra note 5, at 50–52.
Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Democracy, Institutions and Attitudes About
Citizen Influence on Government, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 371, 377 (2002).
44 Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. J.
1043, 1052 (1997).
42
43
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turn out is strongly influenced by effective campaigns that
personalize messages to individuals and provide encouragement,
resources,45 and pressure46 to turn out. Empirically, the link
between the elements of participatory democratic capital—trust
and efficacy—and turnout is not especially strong.47
Perhaps even more problematic to the line of research which
places secondary effects in the framework of how to solve
declining civic engagement is the fact that the much-lamented
declining civic engagement in America (the motivation of many
studies) is an apparition.48 That is, when turnout rates are
adjusted to account for prison populations and non-citizens, voter
turnout is not in decline, but rather, has actually increased
markedly in the last twenty years.49 The 2004, 2008, and 2012
presidential elections saw turnout levels rivaling turnout in the
1950s, and this is after an infusion of voters into the electorate
with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the extension of the
franchise to eighteen to twenty-one year olds in the Twenty-sixth
Amendment to the Constitution. One might argue that some of
the turnout increases experienced in the last three presidential
election cycles are due to increased usage of the ballot initiative.
However, ballot initiatives were most prominent in the 1990s and
have tailed off in the last few cycles.50
Finally, research by John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse
on citizen attitudes towards democracy throws a dose of cold
water onto participatory democratic theory by offering a
comprehensive theory and empirical evidence of citizens’
conflicted attitudes towards greater engagement.51 They argue
that individuals view greater involvement in society as a
necessary evil, precipitated by untrustworthy politicians. Greater
opportunities for participation are viewed in a negative light, as
45 See SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 16 (1995).
46 See Alan S. Gerber & Donald P. Green, The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone
Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 653,
653–55 (2000); Alan S. Gerber et al., Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a
Large-Scale Field Experiment, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 33–34 (2008).
47 See STEVEN ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION,
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 143–45, 150 (1993).
48 See Robert D. Putnam, Tuning in, Tuning out: The Strange Disappearance of
Social Capital in America, 28 POL. SCI. & POL. 664, 664–66 (1995).
49 See Michael P. McDonald & Samuel L. Popkin, The Myth of the Vanishing Voter,
95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 963, 963–66 (2001). For updated data, see Michael McDonald, U.S.
ELECTION PROJECT, http://www.electproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/QPS2-2YTL] (follow
“Voter Turnout Data” hyperlink; then follow “spreadsheet for this entire series” hyperlink).
50 See Joshua J. Dyck & Edward L. Lascher Jr., Direct Democracy and Political
Efficacy Reconsidered, 31 POL. BEHAV. 401, 408–09 (2009).
51 See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS’
BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK passim (2003).
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if citizens resent that they have to do the job of legislators. In an
ideal world, citizens would prefer to be governed by benevolent
public officials. One of the most critical parts of this perspective
is that dishonesty, inaction, and corruption are viewed as the
primary evils of politics; the public is willing to tolerate an
ideologue who they view as genuine, over greater opportunities to
participate.
The expectations of participatory theory, then, face some
significant challenges from what is known about voter turnout
and voter psychology. Participation is not in decline and so the
engagement potential of direct democracy may be addressing a
social ill that is not real. Changes in turnout are not really driven
by trust and efficacy, but rather, by express mobilization efforts
that usually originate with political parties or ideological groups.
And, finally, citizens are not especially enthusiastic to take on a
larger role in decision making.
Participatory theory fares no better in much of the empirical
work on the spillover effects of direct democracy. The most
consistent finding appears to be that ballot initiatives increase
voter turnout. The effect is argued as a general effect: more
initiatives lead to greater turnout, with the effects appearing
strongest in midterm elections when there are more peripheral
voters to mobilize.52 More recently, however, this effect has been
further clarified; ballot initiatives tend to increase turnout only
when the election is competitive53 and when the issue on the
ballot tends to deal with moral issues.54 Taxation issues, by
contrast, according to Biggers, do not lead to turnout gains.55 In
addition, mobilized voters in ballot initiative elections tend to be
partisans.56 None of this suggests that ballot measures are
engaging citizens by giving them a greater stake in their
democracy or that they are being mobilized because of a greater
ability to express nuanced preferences. Instead, this is a story of
money, parties, and groups working to activate and mobilize
citizens.

52 See SMITH & TOLBERT, supra note 5, at 68–70; Caroline J. Tolbert & Daniel A.
Smith, The Educative Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout, 33 AM. POL. RES. 283,
284–85 (2005).
53 See Matt Childers & Mike Binder, Engaged by Initiative? How the Use of Citizen
Initiatives Increases Voter Turnout, 65 POL. RES. Q. 93, 93–94 (2012).
54 See DANIEL R. BIGGERS, MORALITY AT THE BALLOT: DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 47–49 (2014).
55 Id. at 70.
56 See generally Joshua J. Dyck & Nicholas R. Seabrook, Mobilized by Direct
Democracy: Short-Term Versus Long-Term Effects and the Geography of Turnout in Ballot
Measure Elections, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 188 (2010).
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Studies of the effect of direct democracy on political
awareness/knowledge, external efficacy, internal efficacy, and
interest do not portray the same level of consistency in results.
Take, for instance, the sum of the claims made by Smith and
Tolbert in their well-cited contemporary classic work, Educated
by Initiative.57 In their book, several of the findings do not
support the strong conclusion that ballot initiatives enhance civic
engagement. For instance, the effect of ballot initiatives on
political interest falls just short of general academic standards
for statistical significance in 1996, 1998, and 2000; on political
knowledge/awareness, it is only significant in one of three years
of data;58 and on political discussion, it is only significant in one
of three years of data. The strongest finding appears to be on
political efficacy. However, this finding has since been disputed
in two replications.59
B. Which Secondary Effects?
To briefly review, I have argued thus far that it is difficult to
study the primary/policy effects of the ballot initiative because
many of the most controversial approved initiatives are litigated,
invalidated, defunded, or face implementation challenges. This
should put a spotlight on how the initiative affects the
democratic process and citizens. In other words, secondary effects
should be the focus of our studies of the ballot initiative because
checks still exist and are frequently used to challenge policy
outcomes. But the present state of empirical research shows that
the participatory democracy/civic engagement frame by which
most of these studies are motivated has relatively weak empirical
support.
Given that ballot measures are a tool used by out-parties and
interest groups who lack internal strategies to pass legislation
through legislatures, having these measures in the political
environment clearly changes the state of democratic discourse.
More issues are put on the agenda, and on average, even the
most controversial policy items that might not gain agenda
status through regular legislative means are given a potential
forum for open debate and a vote once they qualify for the ballot.
What I present here falls short of a comprehensive theory.

SMITH & TOLBERT, supra note 5, at 61–66.
See Nicholas R. Seabrook et al., Do Ballot Initiatives Increase General Political
Knowledge?, 37 POL. BEHAV. 279, 285 (2014) (disputing the claim that ballot initiatives
appeared to increase political knowledge in 1996, but not in 1998 or 2000).
59 Dyck & Lascher, supra note 50, at 408–09. See generally Daniel Schlozman & Ian
Yohai, How Initiatives Don’t Always Make Citizens: Ballot Initiatives in the American
States, 1978−2004, 30 POL. BEHAV. 469 (2008).
57
58
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Instead, I seek to highlight research that takes seriously the idea
that ballot initiatives affect citizens, without relying on
participatory democratic theory.
1. Trust
Elsewhere, I have written about the ballot initiative and its
effect on both political60 and social61 trust. Political trust is the
trust that we espouse in government; whether or not we trust
those who run the government to do what is right or, at the very
least, what they think is right. The opposite of doing what is
right, when it comes to governmental trust, is acting in a way
that primarily benefits the self. This characterization of
government is widely held and trust-in-government rates tend to
be quite low.62 Another kind of trust is social trust, which is the
trust that we espouse in others, especially strangers.63
Frequent ballot initiatives tend to erode political trust by
doing exactly the opposite of what some participatory democrats
have argued. In this case, empowerment by giving citizens more
decision-making authority on policy only serves to remind people
that government is not to be trusted. The ballot initiative can be
interpreted as a usurpation of legislative authority; the
institution, by its existence, actually then promotes distrust in
government. And, indeed, citizens in states with the ballot
initiative tend to be less trusting of government.64
On social trust, the story is more nuanced. While ballot
initiatives appear to have a modest positive impact on social
trust, the effect is mitigated by higher levels of diversity.
Diversity has been a central concern for the social capital
framework; Putnam even discusses the difference between
bridging and bonding capital.65 This, according to Hero, is
centrally important, as individuals tend to be more trusting
when they are insulated in homogenous communities—which
calls into question the value of a dependent variable which is
activated by increasing segregation.66 In the above-cited study,
60 See generally Joshua J. Dyck, Initiated Distrust: Direct Democracy and Trust in
Government, 37 AM. POL. RES. 539 (2009).
61 See generally Joshua J. Dyck, Racial Threat, Direct Legislation, and Social
Trust: Taking Tyranny Seriously in Studies of the Ballot Initiative, 65 POL. RES. Q. 615
(2012).
62 See Public Trust in Government: 1958–2014, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 13, 2014),
http://www.people-press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/ [http://perma.cc/U7W
G-7EAM] (tracking declining public trust in government over time).
63 See ERIC M. USLANER, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST 2–5, 14–17 (2002).
64 Dyck, supra note 60, at 540.
65 Putnam, supra note 48, at 665.
66 See RODNEY E. HERO, RACIAL AND DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL: EQUALITY AND
COMMUNITY IN AMERICA (2007).

Do Not Delete

2016]

3/5/2016 11:53 AM

New Directions for Empirical Studies of Direct Democracy

125

the model showed that the most trusting state was Oregon, a
state with low levels of racial and ethnic diversity and frequent
ballot initiatives, while the least trusting state was California, a
state with high levels of racial and ethnic diversity, but equally
high levels of ballot initiative usage.
What, therefore, can be said about the impact of ballot
initiatives on trust? On the issue of political trust, more direct
democracy seems to breed more distrust. On social trust, the
story is less clear. While the example of Oregon may go some
lengths to explain why some have argued that direct democracy
as practiced in Switzerland at the cantonal level creates happier
citizens,67 the California case highlights the difficulties of using a
blunt instrument like the ballot initiative to craft policy in a
society of varied interests and perspectives. The latter concern
should be of particular interest to scholars interested in the
secondary effects of direct democracy. Is majority tyranny really
a secondary effect?
2. Majority Tyranny
The U.S. Constitution was crafted with concerns about
majority tyranny as a central issue. Therefore, any institution
that would purport to directly involve citizens in decision-making
must grapple with the question that simple majorities might
make simple decisions that violate the civil rights or liberties of
the individual.68 Much of the literature on majority tyranny has
become intertwined in the morass of trying to parse out which
measures constitute majority tyranny, a decidedly amorphous
concept. One particularly important argument in this thread of
research argues that by most metrics, most people are on the
winning side of ballot initiative campaigns, most of the time.
Therefore, we cannot really classify any specific sub-group as
consistent direct democracy losers, which suggests limited, if any,
instances of tyranny of the majority.69 There are two problems
with this approach, one more obvious than the other. The first is
a problem with defining the minimum sufficient conditions for
majority tyranny. We can imagine a situation where every year
there are ninety-nine initiatives which have nothing to do with
minority rights and one that specifically attacks a minority
group. Even if every one of those minority tyranny initiatives
passed, we might say that only 1% of direct democracy measures
67 See BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS & ECONOMICS: HOW THE
ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT HUMAN WELL-BEING 11, 142–43 (2002).
68 This was a central concern in THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
69 See Zoltan L. Hajnal et al., Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from
California Ballot Proposition Elections, 64 J. POL. 154, 156 (2002).
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potentially violate the rights of minority groups. But, how many
does it take to cross the threshold? And, what are the issues that
constitute majority tyranny in a polarized political climate where
both proponents and opponents of a measure—for instance, to end
affirmative action in government hiring and education—portray
their supporters as victims?
The second problem goes back, once again, to the issue of
court challenges and judicial review. More than thirty statewide
votes in a row, between 1998 and 2006, went against same-sex
marriage. The Supreme Court’s recent validation of full marriage
rights for same-sex couples again poses a difficult question: did
the politics during this time period represent direct democracy
majority tyranny or is same-sex marriage a case study of how,
when ballot measures overstep their bounds, courts can correct
them?
The difficulty in answering this latter question is why
thinking about majority tyranny concerns as secondary effects
can be useful. Because whether or not controversial measures
pass at the ballot box, or are invalidated by courts, they put
arguments and campaigns about these issues onto the public
policy agenda and into the media. To think that there will not be
effects on citizens and democratic discourse from having the
public subject to caustic debates about same-sex marriage over
the last twenty years is naïve. As I noted above, one impact
appears to be an erosion of social trust when states are
sufficiently diverse. There are likely others.
CONCLUSION
One of the cornerstones of American democracy is
federalism, a constitutional feature that grants states the
authority to experiment with their own laws and their own
political institutions. While federalism has a number of
drawbacks, one of the most practical benefits is that when states
engage in experimentation, scholars are afforded the opportunity
to examine differences between states that adopt innovations and
those that do not. Direct democracy reforms, which have arisen
in about half of the states, are now over one hundred years old.
This experiment has allowed scholars and concerned citizens to
learn much about what types of policies pass via direct
democracy and how this affects the average citizen’s experience
with democracy.
A great deal of research has attempted to understand these
concepts, but a new generation of scholarship is still needed. I
have argued that direct democracy scholarship has, by and large,
failed to take seriously concerns that the ballot initiative, in
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particular, will act to tyrannize and target minority groups at the
ballot box.70 In particular, scholarship has not sufficiently
advanced to address the psychological harm and harm to social
capital that has occurred because of efforts that targeted
minority groups, but were later ruled unconstitutional. In large
part, this failure also exists because scholars of spillover or
secondary effects of the ballot initiative have nearly exclusively
used participatory democratic theory as the framework to study
the secondary effects of the ballot initiative. When we unburden
ourselves from using the hypotheses generated by Progressive
thinkers and participatory democrats, we may uncover a great
deal more about the impact that voting on ballot measures has on
its citizens.

70 For a notable exception, see DANIEL C. LEWIS, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND MINORITY
RIGHTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY IN THE AMERICAN
STATES (2013).
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